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Why was the�e no cont�ove�sy ove� life 
in the Scientific Revolution?
Charles T. Wolfe 
“Of all natural forces, vitality is the incommunicable one”
(Fitzgerald 1945: 74)
1� �nt�oduction
To ask why there was no controversy over Life – that is, debates specifically 
focusing on the status of living beings, their mode of functioning, their internal 
mechanisms and above all their ‘uniqueness’ within the physical universe as a 
whole – in the Scientific Revolution is to simultaneously run the risk of extreme 
narrowness of detail and/or of excessive breadth in scope. That is, if we take the 
question ‘why?’ at face value, a succinct answer can be given right away: the 
Scientific Revolution is an intellectual construct that we owe chiefly to the likes 
of Alexandre Koyré and Herbert Butterfield, and it was almost entirely focused 
on the physico-mechanical sciences; the latter focus was rarely challenged in 
the successive historiographic reassessments of this episode which emphasized 
notably its Puritan, gentlemanly or courtly roots,1 and said not a word about 
the life sciences.2 
1� A partial exception would be Kuhn 1976 precisely because he introduces a distinction be-
tween Baconian-inductive pr grammes in natural philosophy and more mathematically ori-
ented programmes. As recently as Biagioli 1998 the standard picture which disregards the life 
sciences is still reiterated, only now with a constructivist flourish that has accents of épater le 
bourgeois: we learn that historians of science still need the concept of the Scientific Revolution to 
preserve their employm nt (Biagioli 1998: 144); but we are able to challenge the existence of this 
historical episode: “If we don’t overdo it, we can safely bite the hand that feeds us” (ibid., 146).
2� Debus 1991, 2001 are exceptions, but they are precisely not ‘mainstream’ Scientific Revolu-
tion narratives. My point is not that no one has studied early modern life science (the bibliog-
raphy of the present essay is filled with references to such studies) but that such studies never 
seem to impact on the picture we have of the Scientific Revolution. Put differently, if we consid-
er as crucial a figure as Harvey and we look at what mainstream history of modern science has 
Un
co
rre
cte
d p
ro
of
s -
 
 
Jo
hn
 B
en
jam
ins
 Pu
bli
shi
ng
 Co
mp
any
188 Charles T. Wolfe
Hence our concept of the Scientific Revolution does not include debates over 
generation, semina rerum, species, anatomy, vivisection, animal souls, irritability 
and so forth.3 Conversely, the title question appears enormous and unmanageable 
once we realize that it implies several other interrelated questions:
 (i) If Life was not a topic of controversy in and for the Scientific Revolution, when 
did it become one? 
This question requires that we decide what counts as a controversy; for surely de-
bates between Harvey and Riolan on the heart, or Whytt and Haller on irritability, 
do not meet the criteria for a ‘strong’ definition of a controversy in the history of 
science, i.e., in Helga Nowotny’s definition, as “part of the collective production 
of knowledge the very lifeblood of science, one of the most productive factors in 
scientific development” (Mendelsohn 1987: 93; see also Dascal 1998). 
 (ii) How should we then understand the various activities that existed at the 
time, from anatomy and physiology (or the study of the ‘animal economy’) to 
medicine overall, as well as natural history, botany, or chemistry?4
Notice that even when we discard monolithic concepts of the Scientific Revolu-
tion and adopt a much more nuanced approach to the disciplinary status and 
diversity of natural philosophy, as Domenico Bertoloni Meli (2008: 709) does in 
an exemplary recent article, emphasizing the interplay between the mathematical 
and medical disciplines, so that “when unraveling the intellectual world in the 
to say about him, here is a sample result: “Shapin’s The Scientific Revolution has two derivative 
remarks, Gaukroger’s comprehensive treatise on western scientific culture mentions him twice 
in passing, but only in the context of the science that came after him, and Dear’s compilation of 
readings from Isis on early modern science omits him altogether… . Kuhn’s celebrated analysis 
of radical disjuncture in the progressions of science sees Bacon, Copernicus, Lavoisier and 
Newton as revolutionary but not Harvey, who is excluded from his account entirely” (Salter 
2010: Introduction). Smith 2009 is an interesting stock-taking of changes wrought in the Sci-
entific Revolution narrative(s) over the past twenty years but also takes no notice of the effect a 
focus on the life sciences might have in this context.
3� It is a mark of the extreme provincialism of the history and philosophy of early modern 
science that it is so preoccupied with endless internal controversies over externalism and in-
ternalism, the role of the Church, or the replicability of an experimentum crucis that it takes 
absolutely no notice of recent (and original) work on the specifically ‘biological’ contribution to 
debates on substance, personal identity, species etc. in early modern thought, in which figures 
like Gassendi or Walter Charleton loom large (see notably Fisher (ed), 2003 and Smith (ed), 
2006). National or linguistic provincialism (Anglocentrism) has been discussed elsewhere, no-
tably with respect to Merton’s and Shapin’s theses.
� For an early attempt to answer this sort of question see Roger 1980: 258f.
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 Why was there no controversy over life in the Scientific Revolution? 18
seventeenth-century, we can no longer separate the history of anatomy from the 
history of science as if anatomists and physicians inhabited a different world from 
not only mechanical and experimental philosophers, but also mathematicians,”5 
this still does not help us answer question (ii) above. We could extend the narra-
tive of the Scientific Revolution to include debates on the circulation of blood, or 
the usefulness of the microscope (say, Borelli versus Locke), or the epistemologi-
cal status of the ‘animal economy’ in relation to machine as well as soul.6 Alterna-
tively, we could be more faithful to the actual contents of the reports presented to 
the Royal Society or the Académie des sciences in their first fifty years of existence, 
which turn out to be much more biologically oriented than traditional historiog-
raphy has led us to believe.7 But in either case, these extensions would miss the 
dimension of ‘crisis’, that is, the sense that the existence of living beings suddenly 
again becomes an explanatory challenge or even a “scandal”, whether from the 
standpoint of physics or on the contrary from the standpoint of the autonomy of 
biology.8
In addition, our title question also implies a historiographic claim about the 
Enlightenment, which follows from (i):
5� To my knowledge the first to raise the issue was Salomon-Bayet 1978: 12, 15, 112, 334 and 
in the Anglophone literature Cook 1990: 401–404. To mention one more example: out of fifteen 
essays by prominent scholars in a recent volume on ‘Rethinking the Scientific Revolution’ (Osler 
[ed], 2000), not a single one treats the life sciences even secondarily. Kiernan 1968 argues for a 
split between physical sciences and life sciences throughout the eighteenth century in France, 
which is very strange, if we consider figures such as Maupertuis, who sought to extend Newto-
nian concepts into the realm of generation, or Buffon, who translated Stephen Hales and sought 
to produce a kind of ‘arithmetic’ of life. Even Diderot declared that his essays on probability were, 
together with the Rêve de D’Alembert, his favourite amongst his writings (Diderot 1961: 126).
� The first case is now too frequently discussed for citations to be necessary; on the latter two 
cases see Salter and Wolfe 2009 and Wolfe and Terada 2008.
7� E.g. Hahn 1971, a classic study of the Académie des Sciences, completely omits the life sci-
ences; Kaplan 1993 fails to consider that ‘embodied forms of knowledge’ really were an issue for 
the Royal Society. Conversely, in a recent attempt to produce a historical survey of the philoso-
phy of biology (Grene and Depew 2004), the authors bypass our era and thus our controversies 
entirely, by moving from Aristotle to Descartes and then to Buffon. That the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuri s might have expressed something of a ‘crisis’ on topics such as body, 
species and the minimal constituents of living matter (e.g. Gassendi, Charleton, Lamy) is not 
an issue for this work.
8� Thus Jacques Monod described the discovery that motivated him to go into biology: “the 
scandal that certain objects exist with the properties of living beings and appearing to violate 
some physical principles or at least the general notion of the physical world. It seemed scandal-
ous to me. I felt naïvely that one had to confront this scandal” (Monod 1970: 50).
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10 Charles T. Wolfe
 (iii) Life is a controversial topic for the eighteenth century, not the seventeenth 
(regardless of the varied and significant contributions of Sanctorius, Harvey, 
Glisson, Malpighi, Baglivi, Descartes, Guillaume Lamy, Swammerdam, Van 
Helmont and others).
This incidentally seems to reverse Foucault’s claim in The Order of Things that Life 
did not exist before the emergence of biology as a science bearing that name, in 
the nineteenth century,9 as well as the much more common claim, found typically 
in histories of physiology and related textbooks, that the ‘modern’, functionally 
specified concept of man as machine successfully banished concepts such as Life 
from science, especially once the ‘machine’ is augmented with Darwinian evolu-
tion and the modern synthesis.10
The irony here is that it is precisely after Cartesian or LaMettrian concepts of 
bêtes-machines or hommes-machines that Life becomes a locus of a kind of onto-
logical crisis, either because natural philosophers worry about what it is, what its 
minimal conditions and components are, or because they worry about the bound-
aries between dead and living matter – such as when Buffon, in his comparison 
of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, ponders the exact nature of “le vivant et 
l’animé”: whether Life is a metaphysical property of certain entities (“un degré 
métaphysique des êtres”) or a “physical property of matter”; he ultimately opts 
for a kind of ‘panspermist’ hypothesis in which life is always potentially present 
in matter, notably in the form of organic molecules, so that “raw matter” merely 
means “dead matter”.11 Similarly, Gabriel-François Venel, in his long entry “Chy-
mie” for the Encyclopédie, states that organic molecules and organized bodies are 
� Foucault 1966, including the claim that “l’histoire naturelle, à l’époque classique, ne peut pas 
se constituer comme biologie” (173). There has been much debate about what Foucault meant 
here, and rather than claim that my analysis rebuts his (for after all, I too am describing a series 
of inquiries into Life which are not constituted as biology), I will simply that my concern with 
Life as an object of controversy and/or crisis is not found in Foucault’s discussion, nor is it af-
fected by it. For an excellent, less tendentious discussion of the shifting meanings of ‘biology’ 
and its predecessors, ‘physiology’ and ‘natural history’, and an analysis of the relation between 
‘philosophy’ and these terms, see Gayon 1998. For the newer view that the eighteenth century 
was significantly concerned with ‘vital’ matters, see Reill 2005, which contains in-depth analy-
ses of Buffon, Barthez and then Herder and the Humboldts, but is confusing taken as a whole 
since these figures do not seem to easily fit in one narrative.
10� The classic, and influential statement of this view is Loeb 1912; see also Smith 1976 for sug-
gestive, but inconclusive discussion.
11� Buffon 1749, II, Histoire générale des animaux, Chapter 1, “Comparaison des animaux et 
des végétaux,” in Buffon 1954: 238a–b; ibid.: Chapter 2, “De la reproduction en général,” in 
 Buffon 1954: 245b.
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 Why was there no controversy over life in the Scientific Revolution? 11
subject to laws that are “essentially different from” the laws of inert matter in mo-
tion; as sources, he refers both to Buffon and to the errors of iatromechanists with 
respect to the functioning of the “animal economy” (Venel 1753: 410).
 Lastly, in addition to this revision of the notion of Enlightenment, our ques-
tion also raises a specific disciplinary issue in close relation to point (ii) above:
 (iv) Does this emerging ontological concern about Life reflect the constitution of a 
science? Is it a precondition for a science? The concern and its various verbal 
expressions clearly predate the coinage of the word ‘biology’ in German and 
French (and its establishment as a science) by roughly a century.
  (Salomon-Bayet 1981; Caron 1988)
As I will try to show in closing, the emergence of a ‘field of controversy’ concern-
ing the status of Life is hardly synonymous with the constitution of the science 
called biology. That does not mean it is not productive of forms of knowledge, 
such as medicine or natural history or in a very different kind of categorization, 
‘knowledge of the body’ (see Wolfe and Gal 2010). But by the time the name ‘biol-
ogy’ (or its close competitor, ‘zoonomy’) comes to the fore as a “synthetic, unitary 
science of life” (Singer [1929] 1958: 917) its concerns are quite different. Similarly, 
the question of the scientificity of medicine and anatomy in the late seventeenth 
century, or their disputed revolutionary status are again not to be confused with 
the existence of controversies over Life.
In what follows I survey (§ 2) some of the possible candidates for ‘contro-
versies over Life’ in early modern natural philosophy, and argue that we should 
not think of them in these terms. I then turn (§ 3) to the context for where I 
do believe Life as a problem emerges – in the interaction between chemical and 
metaphysical debates concerning organisms, substance and fermentation, notably 
between Leibniz and Stahl. In a conceptual development which may seem rather 
counter-intuitive to contemporary readers, who tend to believe that “materialists 
explain everything in terms of matter and motion” whereas so-called animists 
like Stahl or vitalists like Bordeu explain everything “in terms of the soul or vital 
force” (Wellman 2003), the specific preoccupation with the nature of organic Life 
that characterizes Stahl is taken up – in materialist terms – by thinkers such as 
Diderot, as I discuss next (§ 4). Lastly, I ask, here and in the conclusion, how this 
materialist focus on Life did and did not become or at least lead to the constitu-
tion of biology as a science. My analysis spans the periods we call the Scientific 
Revolution and the Enlightenment, but it does not seek to either challenge or 
rehabilitate these terms as historically explanatory categories, although a reader 
with particular interest in such questions might notice that the emergence of Life 
as a locus of ontological crisis (or controversy) roughly matches the shift from the 
former to the latter.
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12 Charles T. Wolfe
2� Was life a cont�ove�sial topic in ea�ly mode�n natu�al philosophy? 
If we can speak of early modern life science, from physiology to theories of gen-
eration, from the chemical investigation of blood, aether and spirits to treatises on 
fermentation and fevers, then we can inquire into its relation to the constitution 
and stabilization of other parts of natural philosophy, such as mechanics and at-
omistic physics. Figures such as Harvey, Descartes and Borelli, or Boyle, Pitcairne 
and Malpighi, or Charleton and Boerhaave then loom large on the map and if our 
goal were to revise accounts of the Scientific Revolution so that they took account 
of such figures, it would seem reasonably easy to achieve. However, if we hoped 
to find scientific discoveries which contribute to a unified notion of physiological 
function, we shall not; if we take, e.g., one century of analyses of digestion, from 
Francesco Redi and Giovanni Borelli in the 1650s–1660s to René de Réaumur and 
Théophile de Bordeu in the 1750s, none of the experiments on gizzards and their 
grinding power, discussed by many naturalists, produce any unified result, until 
Lazzaro Spallanzani conducts experiments on digestion in the 1780s (Salomon-
Bayet 1978: 336f., 342–343, 355f., 348).
But, as I have suggested earlier, another problem arises, which is less easy to 
resolve. In the early 1700s Georg-Ernest Stahl, a court physician to Duke Johann 
Ernst of Saxon-Weimar and subsequently, as of 1694, a Professor of Medicine at 
the University of Halle, stated bluntly: in all these competing theories of the hu-
man body, notably the very successful mechanistic theories, “Life was never men-
tioned nor defined, and I could find no logical definition provided” (Stahl [1706] 
1859, vol. 2: 224). To follow Stahl’s suggestion, we could say that Life is either dis-
cussed but immediately dissipated into the entities and processes which subserve 
it, or promoted to the extent that vital spirits, vital heat, and animation are so co-
extensive to the field of investigation that Life as problem again dissipates into the 
analysis as a whole. There is discussion, but no controversy, in the sense that there 
is no polarization between Life and non-Life (with the notable exception of Stahl 
in his polemic with Leibniz, which I shall turn to in Section 3), nor the possibil-
ity of resolution between two positions, which implies some shared conceptual 
framework (Freudenthal 1998); resolution or conciliation requires at least the sort 
of quasi-paradigmatic framework into which particular cases such as circulation, 
generation, monsters can be fit, as will happen with Haller in the later eighteenth 
century. Let us consider some representative examples.
Boyle’s corpuscularianism, despite its experimental attention to living bod-
ies, the ‘history of human blood’, respiration and so forth, holds that both liv-
ing and nonliving things are arrangements of a single universal matter, which is 
made up of corpuscles. Boyle does not want to trace vitality back to a faculty or a 
power, but rather to a certain arrangement of particles; hence vital processes may 
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 Why was there no controversy over life in the Scientific Revolution? 13
be considered as separations and re-combinations of material corpuscles. Blood 
does not possess an innate faculty which makes it ‘alive’ but, like sweat or snow, 
possesses its specific chemical properties “by virtue of the motion, size, figure 
and contrivance of [its]own parts,” and new qualities are produced by “changing 
the texture or motion” of bodies’ constituent corpuscles.”12 Now, in an interesting 
passage in his Disquisition About the Final Causes of Natural Things – a work in 
which Boyle describes the human body as a ‘hydraulico-pneumatic’ machine – he 
appears to grant that there is a kind of category difference between “Living Ani-
mals” and “Dead ones”, in which the latter are more like stones, possessed simply 
of a static structure. But then he quickly returns to his ‘micro-mechanical’ view 
(even if, qua corpuscularian his mechanism is an enhanced mechanism possessed 
of chemical properties and explains that the difference lies not only in the innu-
merable “Liquors, Spirits, Digestions, Secretions, Coagulations” but also in the 
“Motions” of the body and its limbs, which are present in living bodies but not in 
dead ones; in other words, a purely structural difference (Boyle 1688: 74–75).
If we turn to mechanism, including its medical variant, iatromechanism 
(leaving aside here the irreducible variety of forms of mechanism, the incommen-
surability of their types of explanation, including the possibility that iatromecha-
nism may have been “simply irrelevant to biology”, and the distinction between 
a mechanistic ontology and a mechanistic method13), we might expect to find a 
straightforward elimination of vital properties in favour of size, shape and mo-
tion, including the classic rejection of final causes which is a mark of the Scientific 
Revolution, if we think of Galileo’s description of the ‘fool’ in his Dialogues, Sim-
plicio, as a cause-finalier, who thinks that horses are on earth for the sake of man, 
grass is for horses, clouds and rain are there for the grass (Galileo [1623] 1953: 71), 
or Bacon’s exclusion from “Physick” of explanations such as “the firmness of the 
skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat 
and cold : or, … the leaves of trees are for protecting the fruit” (Bacon [1605] 
2000: 86–87), and of course his ‘barren virgins’. Equally well-known is Spinoza’s 
contempt for the human ignorance which projects concepts of purpose onto the 
natural world, expressed notably in the appendix to Ethics I, where he asserts that 
“final causes are nothing but human fictions”, and the preface to Ethics IV, where 
12� Boyle, Origin of Forms and Qualities (1666), in Boyle 1772, vol. 3: 13; see also Some Con-
siderations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy, Second Tome (1671), in 
ibid., vol. 3: 427; Hall 1969, vol. 1: 294.
13� For the former possibility see Westfall 1971: 104; for the latter distinction see Des Chene 
2005: 249–250.
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1 Charles T. Wolfe
he writes that what we call final cause “is nothing but a human appetite” – the 
causes of which we tend to be unaware of (Spinoza [1675] 2002: 239–240, 321).14
It is known that the exclusion of final causes and thus purposive vital faculties, 
but also humors and elements (Anstey 2011), in favour of a mechanistic scientific 
program produced notable drawbacks, such as the difficulty in accounting for 
epigenetic processes. Thus Descartes, who actively promoted the use of mechani-
cal models as heuristics in studying the body, famously admitted his inability to 
account for the processes of generation in terms that were compatible with the 
mechanistic program he had set out for himself: “The formation of all the parts 
of the human body … is something so difficult that I dare not attempt (to explain 
it) yet” (Descartes to Elisabeth, May 1646, AT, IV: 407); as Dennis Des Chene 
comments: “Among the phenomena of life, generation offers, along with the ap-
parently reasoned behavior of higher animals, the greatest challenge to a science 
based on Cartesian principles” (Des Chene 2003: 413). Indeed, Descartes’ ‘failure’ 
to explain generation was notorious in the eighteenth century, e.g. Réaumur in 
the Art d’éclore des poulets said that it was worse than if Descartes had failed to ex-
plain the universe (Gasking 1967: 68). This much is well known; the point I wish 
to emphasize is that everything ‘vital’ is necessarily excluded from mechanistic 
models, ironically given Descartes’ repeated insistence on health as an ultimate 
value and his ultimate, post-Cartesian doubt insistence on the survival value of 
our sensory organs. This exclusion is manifest in most of the celebrated pieces of 
iatromechanist propaganda, from Baglivi and Boerhaave:
Since Physicians began to examine the Structure and Actions of a living Body, 
not by Physico-Mechanical and Chymical Experiments, but by Geometrico-
Mechanical Principles, they have not only discovered an infinite number of 
things that were unknown to former Ages; but have made it out, that a Human 
Body, as to its natural Actions is truly nothing else but a complex of Chymico-
Mechanical Motions, depending on such Principles as are purely Mathematical. 
For whoever takes an attentive view of its Fabrick, he’ll really meet with Shears in 
the Jaw-bones and Teeth, … Hydraulick Tubes in the Veins, Arteries and other 
Vessels, a Piston in the Heart, a Sieve or Straining-Holes in the Viscera, a Pair of 
Bellows in the Lungs, … Pulleys in the Corners of the Eyes. And tho’ the Chy-
mists explain the Phaenomena of natural Things, by the Terms of Fusion, Subli-
mation, Precipitation &c. And so make a separate sort of Philosophy; yet all these 
1� That Boyle, in his work on final causes which I mention, as well as Leibniz explicitly do not 
reject final causes does not make their denial by Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza any less 
canonical for the Scientific Revolution (or indeed its ideological inheritance from Fontenelle 
and Voltaire onwards).
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 Why was there no controversy over life in the Scientific Revolution? 15
ought to be imputed to the Force of a Wedge, Balance, Leaver, Spring, and such 
like Mechanical Principles … the natural Effects of an animated Body can’t be 
accounted for with greater Facility and Clearness any other way.
  (Baglivi [1696] 1704: 135–136)
and
The solid parts of the human body are either membranous Pipes, or Vessels in-
cluding the Fluids, or else Instruments made up of these, and more solid Fibres, 
so formed and connected, that each of them is capable of performing a particular 
Action by the Structure, whenever they shall be put into Motion; we find some 
of them resemble Pillars, Props, …, some like Axes, Wedges, Leavers and Pul-
lies, others like Cords, Presses or Bellows ; and others again like Sieves, Straines, 
Pipes … ; and the Faculty of performing various Motions by these Instruments, is 
called their Functions, which are all performed by mechanical Laws, and by them 
only are intelligible.  (Boerhaave [1708] 1751: 81)
One can see why Stahl protested that Life had vanished from the bio-medical 
purview. Indeed, in a kind of unconscious echo of Stahl’s concerns, Boerhaave 
declared in a much-cited lecture on the “use of mechanical methods in medicine” 
that “the human body is in its nature the same as the whole of the Universe” 
(Boerhaave [1703] 1983: 96), which I take less as a Renaissance-type statement of 
correspondences and more in the sense of a broadly mechanistic commitment to 
an ontology in which material particles and their interaction exhaustively account 
for the physical universe including ourselves.
In fact, these apparently pure statements of iatromechanism mask a more com-
plex (and concrete) reality on the gr und, where functional dimensions are never 
wholly absent from physiological explanations. Even Descartes, in a 1646 letter to 
Elisabeth will speak of the “office” of the liver (Descartes 1964–1976, IV: 407), and 
chemical explanations as used in medicine by figures such as Thomas Willis and 
Stahl blend, if not seamlessly, quantitative and qualitative definitions of fermenta-
tion, such that one no longer knows what is a strictly particulate explanation ver-
sus one on which invokes ‘liquors’, ‘juices’, ‘heat’, ‘spirits’ and so forth. Consider for 
instance this elegant statement on the body from Bernard de Fontenelle in 1707, 
presented ostensibly in the context of a discussion of the pituitary gland:
The human body considered in relation to an infinite number of voluntary move-
ments it can perform, is a prodigious assemblage of Levers pulled by Ropes. If 
one considers it in relation to the motion of the liquors it contains, it is another 
[sort of] assemblage of an infinite number of Tubes and Hydraulic Machines. 
Finally, if one examines it in relation to the production of these liquors, it is an 
infinite assemblage of Chymical Instruments or Vessels, Filters, Distillation Vats, 
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1 Charles T. Wolfe
Receptacles, Serpentines, etc. … The greatest Chemistry apparatus of all in the 
human Body, the most wonderful Laboratory is in the Brain, from whence this 
Extract of the blood is drawn known as Spirits, the sole material motors of the 
entire Machine of the Body.  (Fontenelle [1707] 1730: 16)15
Regardless, we cannot view these different variations on the mechanistic program 
as comprising a science of life – or if so, then it is one in which Life as in issue is 
completely absent. One notable exception to this narrative of the ‘absence of Life’ 
is Francis Glisson’s Tractatus de natura substantiae energetica, seu de vita naturae 
ejusque tribus facultatibus perceptiva, appetitiva, motiva (Glisson 1672), usually 
referred to as De vita naturae. After publishing various significant medical works, 
such as De rachitide (1650) and De anatomia hepatis in (1654), Glisson produced 
this treatise on the “life of nature,” describing life as immanent to matter: “life is 
the intimate and inseparable essence of matter” and “matter contains within itself 
the root of life.”16 Now, it would be easy to dismiss this as a kind of substance 
metaphysics, as indeed Albrecht von Haller did when he both credited Glisson 
with the discovery of the property of muscular irritability and excluded him from 
the history of science proper (Giglioni 2008); but clearly Glisson reflects on the 
nature of our organic structure (organizatio, § 11), its relation to our sense organs, 
and how animal spirits are not a sufficient explanation of the features of ‘anima-
tion’ and complex perception which our sense organs display.
However, it remains a challenge to integrate this aspect of Glisson into a Sci-
entific Revolution narrative, since it is rather a species of matter theory; what is 
more, this very immanentism means that the nature of Life does not arise as a 
topic for controversy for Glisson. A converse attempt has been made recently by 
Guido Giglioni to present the existence of a ‘vitalistic’ strain no longer in a mar-
ginal but in a central figure, Francis Bacon, focusing on the theme of the ‘appetites 
of matter’ and the related fixation on the “prolongation of life” (Giglioni 2010; 
2005). But on the issue of the demarcation of Life as an object (a) that requires a 
specific science or group of sciences and (b) which existing sciences do not ad-
equately treat, it seems more relevant that when Bacon is outlining the contents of 
the Sylva sylvarum (published posthumously in 1627; in Bacon 1857, vol. II), he 
presents thirteen works as “physiological remains” (Bacon 1857: “Table of Con-
tents”); out of these, seven concern minerals and six concern attractive force and 
15� Translation mine (unless otherwise indicated all translations are mine).
1� Glisson 1672, § 8; I quote from a draft translation of De Vita Naturae by Guido Giglioni, 
which he was kind enough to share with me.
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 Why was there no controversy over life in the Scientific Revolution? 17
the transformations of inanimate bodies (even if Bacon discusses these in ‘biolog-
ical’ terms). Thus Bacon does not attend to, or is not concerned with, a distinction 
between the living and the non-living.
Mechanism, corpuscularianism, Baconian natural philosophy (to which one 
could add Locke’s Helmontian medical reflections but also his philosophical con-
sideration of the Life that is the unity and identity of a plant, animal or a man17) 
do not address the question of Life; they do not see it as a problem, or a fortiori 
an ontological crisis. If it is historically insensitive to leave out the life sciences 
from all accounts of the Scientific Revolution, as so many do, it is also mistaken to 
completely gloss over the problem. Thus Harvey is sometimes simply described as 
a bona fide member of the intellectual construct called ‘Scientific Revolution’, as 
in Gasking (1967: 40): “Harvey … tended to stress the importance of observation 
and experiment, an increased emphasis on which was a vital part of that change 
in outlook which is sometimes called the Scientific Revolution”.18 Another way of 
sweeping the problem under the rug is to state, as Peter Dear has more recently, 
that there is “no reason in principle” to “ignore the sciences of life”, since ‘physics’ 
in the early modern period is conceived as inquiry into nature in general (Dear 
1998: 190). Something is missing from this picture. Some scholars, particularly in 
the humanities, would say that what is missing is the body – and an entire sub-
discipline of cultural history has devoted itself over the past twenty-plus years to 
studying the historical constitution of the body, with particular attention given 
to its Renaissance and early modern formations (see Brown 1988; Turner 1984; 
Sawday 1995; Mandressi 2009; the section on ‘Bodies’ in Cooter and Pickstone 
2000; Wolfe and Gal 2010). But what precisely differentiates a living body from 
a corpse – a leitmotiv in the concern with Life – is heavily determined by the 
natural-philosophical engagement involvement with chemistry. It is to this, via 
Leibniz, that I now turn.
17� See Locke [1701] 1975, II.xxvii.4–6 on the Life qua identity of plants, animals and humans 
in mereological terms. His last word on the question (ibid., III.x.22) does not advance the issue 
very much: the term Life is obvious for everyone, but when one turns to the status of a plant in a 
seed, a chicken in an egg, or a dying man, its sense is harder to grasp. 
18� Rather more à propos is that, whatever Harvey’s epistemological approach towards circu-
lation was (mechanistic? Aristotelean? empiricist? Paduan? hypothetico-deductive?), “he did 
not attempt to formulate any general laws of life on a purely mechanical basis” (Ackerknecht 
1982: 114).
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18 Charles T. Wolfe
3� Machines of natu�e, fe�ments, and chemical metaphysics
Mechanistic approaches to Life should not be caricatured as they sometimes are, 
e.g. by Richard Westfall, who described medical mechanism as “the puppet regime 
set up by the mechanical philosophy’s invasion” (Westfall 1971: 104). Whether in 
its earliest phases or – most evidently – in its late and complexified form such 
as von Haller’s ‘micro-mechanical’ analysis of physiological structure, combin-
ing structural and functional explanations, these approaches are not blind to the 
nature of vital processes, but seek to heuristically model them, e.g. by the usage of 
automata, which Borelli cleverly described as having “a certain shadowy sameness 
(umbratilem similitudinem) to animals” (Borelli 1680, vol. II: § viii).
And yet something has changed by the time of Buffon and Diderot in the late 
1740s. Life, ‘organized bodies’ (corps organisés, organisierte Körper) and gradu-
ally ‘organisms’ are everywhere. The Encyclopédie discusses matters pertaining to 
biological Life far more, proportionately, than its predecessor and inspiration of 
fifty years earlier, Chambers’ Cyclopedia. Conversely, the Encyclopédie has no ar-
ticle on Galileo (whereas Galileo features prominently, e.g. in Brucker’s Historia 
critica philosophiae, which is a major source of the Encyclopédie; Salomon-Bayet 
1978: 384). In § 4 of his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, Diderot gave 
an exhortatory dimension to this state of affairs, and declared that
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people 
seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental 
physics, I dare say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three 
great geometricians remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where 
the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairaut, the Fontaines and the 
D’Alemberts will have left it… . We will not go beyond.  (Diderot 1994: 561)
Similarly, Buffon asserted in his methodological discourse “De la manière d’étudier 
l’Histoire Naturelle” that “mathematical truths are merely mental abstractions, 
which lack anything real” (Buffon 1749: 53). Diderot also gave an explicitly vital 
or biologistic inflexion to metaphysics, declaring in his commentary on Helvétius’ 
De L’Homme [1773–1775] that “It is very hard to think cogently about metaphys-
ics or ethics without being an anatomist, a naturalist, a physiologist, and a physi-
cian” (Diderot 1994: 813; Wellman 1987: 89, n. 43). What were the roots of this 
‘vital’ change? Conc ptually, Leibnizianism plays a key role – not necessarily the 
substance metaphysics of Leibniz as he intended it, but the series of deliberate, 
materialistically and/or biologistically inclined misreadings that were produced 
notably in France during the early Enlightenment, when thinkers such as Mau-
pertuis, Bordeu and Diderot explicitly make use of concepts such as the monad 
but turn them into descriptive tools for the theory of generation, deliberately 
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 Why was there no controversy over life in the Scientific Revolution? 1
ignoring Leibniz’s own distinction between the physical and the metaphysical 
(Canguilhem 1980; Wolfe 2010). In a sense it is ironic for this turn towards Life 
to involve Leibniz so strongly, since he notably described organisms as ‘machines 
of nature’, which are machines down to their smallest parts and rejected extra-
causal, mysterious vital forces. What did he mean by this?
Leibniz, like Aristotle, drew heavily on his observations (and reports from 
microscopists such as Leeuwenhoeck) concerning living beings in the formula-
tion of his metaphysics of substance. It is not that monads possess uniquely vital 
properties, but that their definition is inspired by the self-maintaining, self-regu-
lating, autonomous features of living beings. In addition, Leibniz seems to have 
coined the term ‘organism’ in a technical sense to mean a type of entity different 
from machines, and synonymous with ‘organized body’. (I say ‘technical sense’ 
because the term is used even after Leibniz, e.g. in the Encyclopédie, where it does 
occur, contrary to the claims of earlier scholars, in a yet undefined sense of the 
word, as synonymous with ‘mechanism’.19) But mostly, Leibniz speaks of living 
beings as “machines of nature.” The term first appears in his New System of Nature, 
published in 1695 in the Journal des savants. Machines of nature are machines 
in their “most minute parts” (“moindres parties”), contrary to machines created 
by human artifice (Leibniz 1978, vol. 4: 482); they are machines to infinity also 
in the sense that bodies contain seeds which can never be destroyed (ibid.: 475). 
He also specifies that it is living bodies which are machines of nature (Monadol-
ogy, § 64 and for a full discussion of this notion in Leibniz, Fichant 2003). This is 
where the terminology of ‘organism’ starts to appear: “The organism of a living 
being (organismus viventium) is nothing other than a divine mechanism which is 
more subtle than an ordinary mechanism in the infinity of its subtlety” (Leibniz 
[1903] 1981: 16; Leibniz 1978, vol. 1: 15). Due to the law of the conservation of 
force among other reasons, Leibniz refuses to allow for any type of extra-causal 
influence on bodies of a vital principle that would be separate from bodies as a 
whole. Hence he denies a concept of soul as the motive force or controller in the 
body, which is what Stahl put forth. Leibniz insists that everything that happens 
in Nature happens according to mechanical laws. Of course, Leibniz also holds 
that Life stems from a “deeper source” than the ontological level of mechanically 
specifiable Nature, which remains at the level of passivity (letter to Hoffmann, 
27 September 1699, Hoffmann 1749: 49a–b).20
1� In the Encyclopédie articles “Fibre” and “Nutrition” (VI: 670; XI: 288) the terms “méchanisme” 
and organisme” are used interchangeably, e.g. “the mechanism or organism of nutrition.”
20� Discussed in Duchesneau 1982: 82; Leibniz’s reply to Stahl in Stahl [1720] 1864: 14. For 
further discussion of the Leibniz-Stahl exchange as precisely a controversy see Carvallo 2010.
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200 Charles T. Wolfe
This aspect of Leibniz – that there is something unique about living beings, 
and this uniqueness is metaphysically grounded – was strongly brought to the 
fore by a series of his disciples precisely concerned with ‘biophilosophy’ and, 
increasingly, with the difference between organic and inorganic entities: Louis 
Bourguet in the 1720s and, better-known, Charles Bonnet a generation later. 
Bourguet, in the course of an extensive analysis of crystals, developed an original 
notion of “organic mechanisms” (méchanismes organiques) which functioned in a 
different way than ordinary mechanisms, and directly influenced Buffon’s idea of 
“organic molecules”. He suggested that there was a difference between the growth 
of crystals by juxtaposition, or the “apposition of new parts”, and the organic pro-
cess of intussusception by which new molecules are integrated into the organic 
body and form a part of it, a distinction repeated almost exactly in the second 
half of the eighteenth century by Linnaeus, Bonnet, Lamarck and others.21 The 
distinction between ‘apposition’ and ‘intussusception’ is between two forms of 
growth, the former characteristic of minerals (such as crystals), and the latter 
characteristic of plants and animals, which is the “intussusception of a new mat-
ter” (Maupertuis 1746: 44). Bonnet plays on the French word for organic growth 
(the verb croître) and says that crystals merely agglomerate (accroître) rather than 
actually grow (croître) (Bonnet 1768, vol. 1, ch. XII, §§ 170, 210: 143, 189, 191). 
Bourguet describes “organic mechanisms” in Leibnizian terms as a combination 
of various types of molecules – from aether, water, earth, air, etc. – which are sub-
ordinate to a “dominant Monad or Activity” (Bourguet 1729, 4th letter: 164–165). 
 Bonnet explicitly declares that “nutrition, development and the formation of a 
new organized being are the products of an unknown force … which has noth-
ing in common with mechanical forces” (Bonnet 1764: 92; italics mine) and more 
humorously, that “I have always led my reader back to the Being of beings, and 
shown his handiwork in all the products which had falsely been traced back 
to purely mechanical causes, as if an animal had the same origin as a cheese”22 
(Bonnet was Swiss, after all).
But let us return to the discussion with Stahl, since it is essentially here 
that Leibniz develops a concept of organism, because Stahl, in a combination 
21� Bourguet 1729, 4th letter, 73, 165–166; see Cheung 2006, § 2; also Duchesneau 2003; 
 Linnaeus, Introduction to the Systema naturae (and of course in his celebrated aphorism that 
‘Stones grow, plants grow, and live, animals grow, live and feel’, in the Philosophia botanica); 
Lamarck in the Système des Animaux sans vertèbres, discussing the formation of the shell in 
mollusks (Lamarck 1801: 55).
22� Letter to Malesherbes of October 30, 1762, quoted in Savioz 1948: 214; Bonnet is admittedly 
protesting against the ban of his Considérations.
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 Why was there no controversy over life in the Scientific Revolution? 201
of medico-physiological and chemical reflection, insists repeatedly on Life. To 
put it differently, the recognition of Life as a problem (which goes hand in hand 
with the formulation of ‘organism’ as a concept) is an effect of Leibniz’s de-
bate with Stahl, since their disagreement specifically centres on Stahl’s assertion 
that the organism obeys causal laws which are different from those operating 
in mechanical nature overall, an assertion Leibniz cannot accept although he 
too wishes to defend a concept of organism (Duchesneau 1995; Carvallo 2010). 
And, especially on Stahl’s part, the conceptualization of what an organism is 
and how it differs from a mechanism (or, which is much the same, how a living 
body differs from a dead body) centrally involves chemistry (or ‘chymistry’23); 
hence Life becomes an object of controversy. I shall now discuss this chemical 
contribution to the emergence of Life as an ontologically problematic entity 
(notably with the concept of fermentation, and the consequent role of analyses 
of digestion) before turning, in Section 4, to the radical materialist appropria-
tion of these inseparably chemical and ‘biophilosophical’ elements, and its rela-
tion to the constitution of ‘biology’.
If we recall Bourguet’s distinction between the formation of crystals by jux-
taposition of their components, versus organic entities which are formed by the 
intussusception of their molecules, the issue with chemistry – particularly the no-
tions of fermentation and ‘seeds’ (what Gassendi called, using a Lucretian term, 
semina rerum; the difference is that for Lucretius these ‘seeds’ were simply atoms, 
whereas for Gassendi they were composites or compounds of atoms24) – revolves 
around a distinction between beings that are merely ‘formed’ and beings that are 
‘generated’. It is only in the late seventeenth century that this distinction becomes 
crucial – both because the list of candidates for the latter gradually gets defined 
more narrowly, so it can no longer include metals, crystals and minerals, and 
because the iatrochemical Paracelsian–Helmontian–Sylvian–Stahlian tradition of 
23� The term ‘chymistry’ is increasingly preferred in current scholarly usage, as it emphasizes 
the absence of a non-arbitrary and historically justified analytic division between ‘chemistry’ 
and ‘alchemy’ in the early modern period. While there was certainly a range of theories and 
practices in the science of matter, ‘chemistry’ and ‘alchemy’ do not pick out a meaningful divi-
sion within that range, and so the term ‘chymistry’ is used as a general term for all such theories 
and practices, following Principe and Newman 1998. (Thanks to Lydia Barnett whose work 
helped me see this more clearly.)
2� Bloch 1971: 252, n.75. On the shifting meanings of vital minima, notably ‘molecules’, in 
seventeenth-century chemistry, matter theory and philosophy see, in addition to Bloch 1971, 
Clericuzio 2000: 63–71, and for the impact of semina rerum on early modern matter theory 
overall, Hirai 2005.
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202 Charles T. Wolfe
‘chymistry’ strongly focuses on the processes that are unique to organic beings, 
such as fermentation.25
A major source for this idea of fermentation is Thomas Willis (1622–1675), 
who taught natural philosophy at Oxford and medicine in London; he was best 
known perhaps for his discovery of the ‘circle of Willis’ and his great work on the 
anatomy of the brain, De cerebri anatome (1664) (richly illustrated by Christopher 
Wren). But the work that concerns us is his De fermentatione (1659), translated 
as A Medical-Philosophical Discourse of Fermentation; or, Of the Intestine Motion 
of Particles in Every Body. De fermentatione was meant to be the introduction 
to his theory of fevers, which in fact he explained as the outcome of a vitiated 
fermentation of blood (Willis also says that he added a treatise on fever to the 
one on fermentation in order to apply his fermentation theory to fever). “Eve-
ry disease acts its Tragedies by the strength of some Ferment” (Willis; in Debus 
2001: 69). Is fermentation chemical or mechanical? The iatrochemical answer 
should be straightforwardly the former, since it describes all material bodies as 
being composed of the principles of Spirit, Sulphur, Salt, Water and Earth and the 
mixture and proportion of these.26 But Willis complicates matters by sometimes 
speaking of fermentation in more purely iatrochemical terms, sometimes in more 
mechanical terms, as a motion of the parts. Ferments helped kindle the particles 
of spirit and sulphur in the blood into a flame, a combustion that was also called 
effervescence of the blood, which is how Willis explains body heat and fever. The 
fermentation in the heart heats the blood like “Water Boyling over a Fire”,27 and 
this heat is distributed to the whole body through blood circulation, constituting 
the common cause of ordinary body warmth as well as febrile heat. Our body 
heat is the effect of a chemical cause – specifically, of fermentation.28 And, most 
25� I thank Justin E. H. Smith for this suggestion. Joly 2004 observes that Renaissance and early 
modern chymical treatises frequently describe minerals and metals in terms which we would 
only use for living beings (“seeds and germination, growth and rot, death and resurrection”); 
he suggests that this is less because the chemists were intellectually chaotic and more because a 
doctrine of living being was simply absent.
2� According to Clericuzio (ms., 2009), spirits, sulphur and salts are the active principles (with 
spirits being the most active), while earth and water are passive. Spirits affect various properties 
of the body, from heat to conservation to preventing putrefaction; e.g., the digestive system is 
described as a process of fermentation in the stomach. For a discussion of chemical vs. me-
chanical explanations of fermentation, see Mendelsohn 1964: 380; Chang 2002: 56, 59f.
27� Willis, Of Feavers, in Willis [1659] 1681, Chapter I, § 1: 59 (pagination continuous with Of 
Fermentation); Chang 2004: 785.
28� Bates 1981 suggests that “for Fernel [and all traditional Galenists], the essence of fever was 
preternatural heat whereas for Willis it was an inordinate motion of the blood” (49).
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relevantly for us, “The first beginnings of life proceed from the spirit fermenting 
in the heart” (Willis [1659] 1681, Chapter V: 13).
Stahl, too, viewed the body as composed of organic matter in a process of 
fermentation, which in fact meant it was vulnerable to putrefaction – indeed, al-
ways in a process of putrefaction in some sense. Some parts of the body are more 
vulnerable than others, notably the blood; hence Stahl describes circulation as a 
process which preserves the mixtio of the blood and thereby maintains the stabil-
ity of the whole. This is a good example of how his system renders the chemical 
and the metaphysical almost indissociable, in his description of the living body 
as a kind of dynamic equilibrium which constantly has to be maintained. On the 
one hand this equilibrium is chemically specified, both at the level of the concept 
of fermentation and with the description of the body as a chemical mixtio, not a 
mere aggregate: since aggregates are merely mechanical combinations of portions 
of matter in motion, whereas mixts imply a notion of qualitative diversity above 
and beyond the spatial proximity between particles. (This distinction, which is 
crucial for Stahl, will be wholly appropriated by Diderot who uses it to define 
the relation between matter in general, living, sensing individual molecules and 
the ‘sensitivity of the whole’). Leibniz reiterated this in his own terms: “a mass of 
matter is not properly what I call a corporeal substance, but rather an aggregate 
of an infinity of such substances, like a pack of sheep or a pile of worms.”29 On 
the other hand, Stahl famously describes the body and its organs as literally mere 
instruments of the soul, a position sometimes revised so that “organs are not, as 
the name might suggest, mere instruments”, but nevertheless, “it is the soul that 
makes the lungs breathe, the heart beat, the blood circulate, the stomach digest, 
the liver secrete” (Stahl 1859: 347). Put these two together and you have the notion 
of a “highly fermentable organic body [which] has to rely on a vigilant anima to 
discharge the corrupt and harmful materials from the vital economy in a timely 
manner” (Chang 2002: 63).30
These concepts of fermentation are closely linked to concepts of Life, and 
indeed were actively taken up in the second half of the eighteenth century by vi-
talists, notably when dealing with the phenomenon of digestion. Whereas mecha-
nists or ‘solidists’ (who held that illness is due to a pathological change in the 
solid parts of the body, as opposed notably to humoralists), but also Newtonian-
inspired physicians including Boerhaave and Pitcairne reduced digestion to a 
quantitative process of ‘trituration’, of spatial relations between masses, or more 
2� Leibniz, “Éclaircissement sur les Natures Plastiques et les Principes de Vie et de Mouve-
ment” (1704), in Leibniz 1978, vol. 6: 550.
30� It’s not always so clear-cut, though, because chemistry for Stahl is both something foreign 
to the theoria medica vera and nevertheless that which explains life (Roger 1979: 45).
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specifically the expansion and contraction of muscles, iatrochemical physicians 
and post-Stahlian chemists like Venel – in his articles for the Encyclopédie in-
cluding “Chymie”, “Chaleur”, “Digestion” and “Mixte” – emphasized the chemical 
transformations of the substances involved in the digestive process. Thus François 
Boissier de Sauvages, in his Nosologie méthodique of 1763, explains that the facul-
ties of the body are equivalent to the properties of matter in general (e.g. gravity, 
elasticity and attraction), but that within the organism these produce processes 
of fermentation and putrefaction which seem to be restricted to living beings 
(Sauvages [1763] 1771, I, §§ 150–154, 261, 266).
Of course, the mechanical explanations of digestion are augmented with pro-
cesses such as heat, vibration, the action of the spirits, and continuous compression, 
recalling our earlier point that it is not always appropriate to fully distinguish the 
‘mechanical’ and the ‘purposive’ or the ‘functional’, either in seventeenth- or eigh-
teenth-century physiology and natural philosophy. Sauvages believed that the fully 
self-contained nature of his calculations on the body’s energy proved the existence 
of an independent soul which was the source of this motion, and – surprisingly, 
we would think, for someone who stresses the causal role of the soul in vital func-
tions (i.e., what came to be called an ‘animist’) – praised the discoveries of Baglivi, 
Pitcairne, Newton and Boerhaave precisely for their calculations as applied to the 
body (Sauvages 1731: 2). As Roger French comments, “it is something of an ‘ism’ 
paradox that the eighteenth-century ‘mechanists’ generally described the body in 
non-quantitative terms whereas the ‘animists’ used mathematics to demonstrate 
the need of a soul to power the machine of the body” (French 1990: 103). A missing 
term in this opposition between mechanism and animism is vitalism.
Organisms, ferments and digestive systems all have some more or less obvious, 
more or less intuitive relation to an idea we might call Life, and indeed gradually, 
from the iatrochemists to Stahl, and onwards to his disciples in the mid-eigh-
teenth century and their Auseinandersetzungen with the group of physicians who 
come to be called vitalists by the dawn of the next century,31 these kinds of phe-
nomena, together with more broad research programmes such as physiology (as 
opposed to anatomy), are being presented as specifically vital. Venel, in the article 
“Chimie” in the Encyclopédie, speaks of “changes” which bodies undergo, such 
that they “move from the non-organic state to the organic state”, and suggests that 
the “phenomena of organisation [i.e. organism, organic phenomena] should be 
treated by a science separate from all other parts of Physic”, namely, chemistry 
(Venel 1753: 410). Where is the crisis, then? What happened to the ontological 
31� The word ‘vitalist’ appears at much the same time as does the word ‘biology’, a fact that has 
not so far been discussed much, if it all. On the history of the former, see Wolfe and Terada 
2008; on the latter, see Caron 1988 and Barsanti 2000.
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controversy? Remember that Stahl had spoken in fairly strong terms, if not of 
scandal then at least of shock: “What shocked me above all was that in this physi-
cal theory of the human body, Life was never mentioned nor defined, and I could 
find no logical definition provided” (Stahl [1706] 1859, vol. 2: 224). And through-
out the collection of essays entitled Theoria medica vera (Stahl [1708] 1860), he 
asks about what we call Life and what purpose does it serve within and outside the 
body? Stahl is challenging a dominant, and vast set of views partly encapsulated 
under the notion of mechanism, or specifically iatromechanism. He does not re-
spond with a coherent model, program, or unifying concept, such as ‘organicism’ 
which other physiologists and teaching physicians could both apply and improve 
on, as Haller precisely did with his physiological model (usually referred to as the 
Göttingen school; see Steinke 2005). Had Stahl done so we could possibly study 
various tensions between mechanistic medicine, physiology and chemistry and 
organicist medicine, physiology and chemistry as bona fide controversies.
From an external standpoint, as historians or onlookers in general, the prob-
lem is not so much to find a definition – at the present time we still have not 
agreed on a definition of Life, or what constitutes its exact origin (see Deamer 
and Fleishaker 1994) – as to understand why it becomes a problem and what the 
effects of this problem are. One response, a fairly rhetorical one, is that of the 
Montpellier vitalist physician Théophile de Bordeu: “Spare us, once and for all, 
all these tiny fibres, pressures, globules, thick substances, sharp angles, lymph, 
hammers and all the rest of the equipment from mechanical workshops with 
which [earlier doctors] filled the living body – they were the playthings of our 
fathers” (Bordeu [1764] 1818, vol. 2: 670). Another possible answer to the ‘why?’ 
question is suggested less rhetorically by Peter Hans Reill: “if mechanism could, 
e.g., explain the pumping action of the heart, it was incapable of saying why the 
heart continually kept pumping without running down” (Reill 2005: 135). Ob-
viously, for Stahl a major part of the answer lay in the soul, and specifically its 
purposive, goal-directed action, a view which earned him the ridicule of many 
prominent scientists, such as Haller, who suggested that Stahlians (who rejected 
interventionist medicine in the face of disease) were to mechanist physicians like 
a half-naked ancient German warrior was, compared with an armed Roman cen-
turion, in uniform.32 One can also try and reconstruct Stahl’s often unnecessarily 
obscure argumentation in a charitable way, and point out that he never denies 
the basic laws of physics and chemistry, nor the fact that living bodies, too, obey 
the laws of motion. As we saw with fermentation, the idea is rather to articulate a 
32� Haller 1751: 956 (a review of Volters’ Gedancken von Psychologischen sachen), as quoted in 
Reill 2005: 123–124.
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kind of ‘emergentist’ view in the weak sense that certain arrangements of particles 
exhibit complex, goal-directed behavior.33
However, Stahl is quite adamant that the above be attributed to the soul, 
which then controls the various mechanically specifiable parts of the body as so 
many instruments. Stahl is a teleologist, who definitely believes, not unlike his 
twentieth-century compatirot Wilhelm Reich (1968: 45), that “The question, 
‘What is life?’ lay behind everything I learned. Life seemed to be characterized by 
a peculiar reasonableness and purposefulness of instinctive involuntary action for 
both an anti-reductionist interpretation (his own), and a reductionist interpreta-
tion – which is not specifically mechanistic, as we shall see – with materialists 
such as Buffon and Diderot. And in this reductionist approach, the vital dimen-
sion is not discarded.
� Constitutive mate�ialist ontology of life  
o� g�adual constitution of biology?
Neither biology nor chemistry exist as stable theoretical entities in the early mod-
ern or Enlightenment periods, even if chemistry had existed for a long time, but 
on unstable methodological and conceptual bases. Yet the constitution of an au-
tonomous ontological region corresponding to ‘the science of living beings’, i.e. 
biology, is significantly affected by chemistry, as we have seen. One way to de-
scribe this is to say that chemistry is, at least at this time, the science which “allows 
for an understanding of matter as something that – at least provisionally – cannot 
be reduced to calculation” (Starobinski 1999: 86). Recall Buffon’s and Diderot’s 
anti-mathematical proclamations of a new science of Life (“natural history”, but 
also the study of the “animal economy” in medicine), or the prominence of vital 
matters in the Encyclopédie.
Iatrochemical, Stahlian concepts that merge the chemical and the metaphysi-
cal are turned into reductive materialist concepts by Diderot (reductive notably in 
the sense that they are meant to replace explanations that appeal, e.g. to the soul). 
Yet these concepts are not themselves meant to be mechanically or ultimately, 
mathematically specifiable. This takes several interrelated forms: Diderot’s en-
riched atomism of vital minima, in which the ‘atoms’ or ‘molecules’ of living mat-
ter are themselves alive; his transformation of Hallerian irritability via Bordeu’s 
33� T. S. Hall describes certain theories of Life in the eighteenth century (notably that of 
 Maupertuis) as ‘emergentist’ (Hall 1968, vol. 2: 26–28); for additional discussion of how 
 eighteenth-century models of organic life can be understood as ‘organizational’ and thus be-
yond the split between reduction and emergence, see Wolfe and Terada 2008: 558–574.
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concept of sensitivity (sensibilité) into a concept of organic sensitivity which is 
itself a property of living matter. The difference between irritability and sensitivity 
in Haller is that the former is fully mechanically specifiable and is strictly a prop-
erty of muscle fibres, while the latter has a functional component as it is directed 
towards the organism’s survival, and it presupposes the existence of the ‘soul’.
In Diderot, this difference is collapsed into one property of living matter, with 
some waverings as to whether this property occurs in the elements or only in 
organized wholes, but he seems to opt ultimately for the latter. Sensitivity and 
therefore Life require, according to Diderot, the presence of organic “continuity” 
rather than mere spatial “contiguity” (Diderot’s terms, which map onto Stahl’s dis-
tinction between aggregate and mixt; Diderot 1994: 625–628; Boury 2006; Wolfe 
2006). The difference between the life of an organic being and the life of a wooden 
automaton, or a watch, is not that the former possesses a soul, or is free, whereas 
the latter is not. The difference is, one might say, a structural one, between two 
different types of arrangements of parts. This is what Leibniz, a favourite au-
thor of Diderot’s, meant when he declared that “a feeling or sensing being is not 
something mechanical like a watch or a windmill” (Preface to the New Essays, in 
 Leibniz 1978, vol. 5: 59) or, in Diderot’s version, which reflects his annoyance with 
the prevalent clock metaphor: “What a difference there is, between a sensing, liv-
ing watch and a golden, iron, silver or copper watch!” (Elements of Physiology, in 
Diderot 1994: 1283).
It is for this reason that the concept of ‘mechanistic materialism’ is so prob-
lematic, and perhaps downright false (Kaitaro 1987): because most materialists, 
unlike Descartes, do not claim that physical nature is essentially specifiable in 
mechanistic terms. Diderot’s challenge is to be able to do justice to the difference 
between organic and inorganic beings, without having reference to a concept of 
‘soul’, anima, as the basis of animation, given that the distinction between ‘animate’ 
and ‘inanimate’ initially means ‘possessed-of-soul’ versus ‘not-possessed-of soul’ 
(Cunningham 2003: 58). This will be the concept of active, sensing matter. Hence 
his materialism is significantly focused on the concept of Life. It is in this sense 
that his “revolutionary” fervour (the Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature’s 
“We are at the dawn of a revolution”, Diderot 1994: 561) is not just a way of par-
ticipating in the emergence of biology as a science, since it is also a philosophical 
project. Consider the article “Spinosiste” of the Encyclopédie, by Diderot: 
Spinosist: follower of the philosophy of Spinosa. One must not confuse the an-
cient Spinosists with the modern Spinosists. The general principle of the latter 
is that matter is sensitive; they demonstrate this by the development of the egg, 
an inert body which by the sole means [instrument] of graduated heat moves to 
the state of a sensing, living being, and by the growth of any animal which in its 
inception [principe] is merely a point, and through the nutritive assimilation of 
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plants and – in one word – of all substances that serve the purpose of nutrition, 
becomes a great sensing and living body in a greater [expanse of] space. From 
this they conclude that only matter exists, and that it is sufficient to explain ev-
erything. For the rest, they follow ancient Spinosism in all of its consequences. 
 (Encyclopédie, vol. XV: 474; Diderot 1994: 484)
No one has ever produced a satisfactory explanation as to why Diderot chooses to 
place an affirmation of his biologically motivated metaphysics within an entry on 
a philosopher (or a derivative of the philosopher) who did not himself think there 
was anything metaphysically unique about living beings. The first scholar to call 
attention to it, Paul Vernière, invented “neo-Spinozism”, as a category to describe 
precisely this biologically reconceptualized Spinozism. Vernière meant by this a 
form of holist materialism founded on the life sciences rather than on a priori meta-
physical speculation (Vernière [1954] 1982: 529); what “neo-Spinozism”, which he 
attributes not just to Diderot but to Maupertuis as well, does is “refashion a mo-
nism more in accordance with the findings of science” (ibid.: 533). In the present 
context I will content myself with the observation that the difference between “an-
cient Spinosists” and “modern Spinosists” effectively maps onto the historical nar-
rative I have been suggesting: whereas ancient Spinosists are essentially substance 
metaphysicians, their modern descendents are essentially focused on Life, specifi-
cally, the radical implications of the biological theory of epigenesis.
Harvey, who is supposed to have coined the term, defines epigenesis as “the 
superaddition of parts out of the power or potentiality of the pre-existent matter” 
(Harvey 1653: 223). More specifically, epigenesis is the theory of generation (or 
development as we would now call it) in which the characteristics and structure 
of the mature organism may be pre-determined in the embryo, but are not “pre-
imprinted” in it. Rather, they are acquired during the course of a gradual develop-
ment, in which the embryo undergoes transformations under the influence of the 
environment. In this sense, it is opposed to the preformationist theory, according 
to which all the characteristics of the developed organism correspond directly to 
characteristics “imprinted” in the embryo. Thus ‘epigenesis versus preformation-
ism’ seems like the basis f r a controversy in the theory of generation. We might 
think that we have finally encountered a proper controversy over Life; but in fact 
it does not become one until Diderot takes hold of it. Or rather, to introduce a dis-
tinction, if ‘preformationism versus epigenesis’ is a controversy in the life sciences, 
beginning fitfully in the early 1700s in the Académie des sciences and reaching full 
velocity with Haller, Wolff, and Blumenbach in the late years of the century, what 
happens with Diderot is that it becomes, precisely in the wake or rather the vein of 
Stahl, an ontological controversy. This is most explicit if we add to the entry “Spi-
nosiste” a passage from D’Alembert’s Dream, the first sentence of which François 
Jacob in fact used as an epigraph for his La logique du vivant (Jacob 1970):
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Do you see this egg? With this you can overthrow all the schools of theology, 
all the churches of the world. What is this egg? An unsensing mass, prior to the 
introduction of the seed [germe]; and after the seed has been introduced, what is 
it then? Still an unsensing mass, for the seed itself is merely an inert, crude fluid. 
How will this mass develop into a different [level of] organisation, to sensitivity 
and life? By means of heat. And what will produce the heat? Motion.
  (Diderot 1994: 618)
Aside from its stated radical dimension (to overthrow all schools of theology), 
there is also clearly something ‘vital’ about the commitment to epigenesis, or even 
vitalistic, since “All believers in epigenesis are Vitalists”, as Hans Driesch observed 
(Driesch 1914: 39; see Oyama 2010).
The transformative, ‘epigenetic’ dimension of living beings, which fascinates 
Diderot (“Voyez-vous cet œuf ?”) or La Mettrie (who uses Lucretian motifs to 
describe the living Earth as like a womb (utérus) which has now grown barren, so 
that new species do not arise34), which also fuels the fascination with monsters, is 
very far removed from the set of possible criteria for the science of biology by the 
early nineteenth century, which include a reductive constraint on explanations 
of living beings in terms of their physico-chemical nature, a unification criterion 
which states that all living entities (including plants and animals) possess prop-
erties such as development, reproduction, nutrition, respiration, beginning in a 
basic substance (protoplasm) and ultimately arriving, by the middle of the nine-
teenth century, at the study of development, focusing on structure and function 
(morphology and anatomy versus physiology); at this point biology also requires 
cell theory in order to explain cellular division and conjugation, and has to in-
corporate evolutionary and ecological components (Singer [1929] 1958; Caron 
1988; Barsanti 2000). It is no surprise that Cuvier by 1810 can declare that “the 
anatomical portion of the general problem of life has been resolved for a long 
time, at least as concerns the animals which interest us the most” (Cuvier 1810, 
“Histoire naturelle”, II: 207).
To reiterate the point otherwise, the various instances of an emerging ‘life 
science’ in the eighteenth century, from the renewal of theories of generation to 
Haller’s work on irritability, to pieces of ‘folk biology’ such as Trembley’s polyp 
or Bonnet’s aphids (Roe 1981; Lenhoff and Lenhoff 1989) are not themselves 
identical with an ontological concern with the status of Life. To conflate these 
two would be to create a monolithic concept of vitalism which would somehow 
lead inexorably to the constitution of biology as a science. As much as Buffon, 
Haller, Barthez, Blumenbach, Bordeu, Venel, Diderot and especially Ménuret de 
3� La Mettrie [1750] 1987, Sections 8–11; he thinks the moderns can improve experimentally 
on this view, but does not reject it wholeheartedly.
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 Chambaud insist on the separation between life sciences and physical sciences – a 
separation which formally culminates in Bichat, Cabanis, and Bernard – it is not 
clear that all these figures, and certainly not Bichat or the ‘founders’ (or at least 
coiners) of biology Lamarck, Treviranus and Carl Christian Erhard Schmid (the 
author of Physiologie philosophisch bearbeitet, 1798–1801)35 care about ontology. 
After all, no less a figure than the head of the Montpellier vitalists, Paul-Joseph 
Barthez, declared “I am as indifferent as could be regarding Ontology considered 
as the science of entities” (Barthez 1806, vol. 1: 96, n. 17).
It is true that some of these figures viewed these episodes of the coming-
to-be of biology as not conforming to the laws of mechanics (or even violating 
them), and thus placing “in serious difficulty the traditional paradigm, based on 
the sovereignty of physics” (Barsanti 2000: 124). Thus the geologist Jean-Claude 
Delamétherie declared that the living being was “a machine that confounds all 
our ideas of mechanics”.36 But the more a science of biology emerges the less it is 
concerned with the ontological crisis about Life. My interest here is more in the 
problematic status of Life in between historical categories such as the Scientific 
Revolution and the Enlightenment, and less to produce some ahistorical typology 
of controversies; but one is tempted to venture a distinction between an ontologi-
cally controversial moment (Stahl, and its materialist version in Diderot) and a 
functionally controversial moment that emerges with the positive science of life. 
5� Conclusion
Why was there no controversy over Life in the Scientific Revolution? This episode, 
or absence thereof, is very difficult to make sense of in terms of familiar concepts 
such as ‘paradigms’ or ‘normal science’, for at least two reasons. First, since the sci-
ences involved in the constitution of Life as a problem are not unified, discursively, 
experimentally or by their objects, whether we speak of alchemy, natural history, 
iatrochemical medicine or ‘metaphysical’ reflections on vital minima and the rela-
tion of body and soul; as Claire Salomon-Bayet nicely suggests, it would then have 
to be a “permanent revolution” (Salomon-Bayet 1978: 15; Salomon-Bayet 1981: 36, 
39) lasting one hundred and fifty years (in her case the object is the study of life 
35� Schmid 1798–1801, I: 140, cit. in Risse 1972: 153–154. See Schiller 1980: 85–87; Caron 
1988: 231–232 for further indications on the early uses of ‘biology’, ‘zoonomy’ and the older 
‘physiology’ to designate the same science.
3� Delamétherie 1787, II: 292, cited by Barsanti 2000: 124.
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in the Académie des sciences; we could just as well say ‘from Harvey to Pasteur’37). 
Second, by the time it (biology, medicine, etc.) is a science and is perhaps on the 
way to producing normal vs. abnormal patterns of discourse,38 it has already lost 
its ontological dimension and thus its sense of being a crisis or a “scandal” – even if 
figures such as Hans Driesch at the end of the nineteenth century can effectively re-
play Stahl versus mechanism, invoking Aristotelian entelechies just like Stahl did. 
This lack of fit between the various strands of the Life narrative in early modern 
science, and Kuhnian concepts such as paradigms, is sometimes used to demon-
strate that Kuhn’s concepts might not work here (Salomon-Bayet 1981), even if 
some attempts have been made, unsuccessfully, to interpret notably Haller’s en-
hanced mechanistic model for physiology as precisely a “paradigm shift” (Toellner 
1977). What it tells us here is not so much a matter for Kuhnian philology as a 
problem for understanding the development of biology as a discipline and how it 
relates to the more ontologically oriented discussions of the previous century, from 
the core years of the Scientific Revolution to the Spätaufklärung.
If, then, Life and the investigation into Life is not manageable as a Scientific 
Revolution narrative, we can of course revise the latter to include more discussion 
of animal spirits, of Newton’s queries on sensation and their influence on bio-
medicine in the next generation, and of course of the shift from a notion of ‘soul’ 
to various embodied and cognitive concepts. We can also insist on the presence 
of quantitative experimentation, notably in the Italian anatomists. But we will 
not able to reconstruct a controversy over Life within the frame of the develop-
ment of biology. In the seventeenth century Life is either everywhere, as in Gas-
sendi or Glisson, but it is immediately dissipated into the entities and processes 
which mechanistically subserve it, or promoted to the extent that vital spirits, 
vital heat, ferments, seeds and other forms of animation are so co-extensive to 
the field of investigation that Life again dissipates into the analysis as a whole. 
There is discussion, but no controversy, in the sense that there is no polarization 
between Life and non-Life. In the eighteenth century, with Stahl and Diderot, Life 
becomes a ‘crisis’ concept – with anti-reductionist and reductionist trajectories, 
respectively – until by the early nineteenth century it resolves into being a struc-
tural concept with no ontological component. This is patently the case in Claude 
37� Cuvier provides his own capsule history of the birth of life science qua science (i.e. as a sys-
tem allowing for causal explanations): we have known the causal processes at work in digestion 
for centuries; the absorption of substances, since Pecquet, Rudbeck et Ruysch; the process of 
circulation, since Harvey. “The work of the English and Italian anatomists on the lymphatic sys-
tem has … completed everything that remained to be said in this regard” (Cuvier 1810: 208).
38� Say, Pasteur versus Pouchet on spontaneous generation or Cuvier versus Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire on the the plan d’organisation (mentioned in Dascal 1998).
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Bernard – a careful reader of Diderot, who left behind an unpublished manu-
script on the latter’s medical and physiological writings (Barral 1900) – for whom 
vitality is an effect of a particular type of physical organization, and nothing more: 
“l’élément ultime du phénomène est physique; l’arrangement est vital.”39
We could conclude, following a hint of François Duchesneau’s, that the con-
cept of Life is an artificial construct, an être de raison created when rationality runs 
up against the speculative limits of a physiological theory that experience cannot 
wholly circumscribe (Duchesneau 1982: 487). But what about the “revolutionary” 
force of epigenesis? The sense Diderot had that he and others were “on the verge of 
a great revolution in the sciences”, but not a revolution that was subsumed under an 
autonomous science of biology? As I have tried to describe, this “great revolution” 
which did not happen at least as envisaged by Diderot, combines the ontological 
crisis component of Stahlian animism with the new materialist focus on epigenesis 
and other key features of biological entities (“modern Spinosism”, as Diderot calls 
it). It is neither a feature of the Scientific Revolution nor of the Enlightenment per 
se; it is more of a Sattelzeit, Reinhart Koselleck’s term for epochs which lie in be-
tween the recognized stages in our historical narratives, whether as transitions or 
as inassimilable moments (Zammito 2004). This Sattelzeit of Life as a scientific and 
philosophical problem, prior to the emergence of biology as a positive science in the 
nineteenth century, combines both a mechanistic interest in structures, components 
and ‘how things are put together’ with a recognition of the challenge created by new 
concepts of organism, body, animal economy etc.; and yet it does not hypostatize 
these concepts into transcendent entities beyond the reach of natural science. It is 
this radical, ontologically controversial aspect of Life that I have discussed here.40
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